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COMMENT




Women have been afforded greater opportunities in the
workplace since the adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Nevertheless, these opportunities arguably are still
hindered by certain employer policies and actions.' Title VII
makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."2  In 1978, Title VII was
amended to include discrimination based on "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions" as discrimination on
the basis of sex.3  This amendment, the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, was added in response to discrimination
women faced at the hands of these policies.4 Despite this,
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., May
2000, University of Pennsylvania.
1 See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73
WASH. L. REV. 363, 373 (1998) (arguing that employers' policies that exclude
contraceptives from otherwise comprehensive prescription plans disproportionately
impact women); see also Kathleen A. Bergin, Contraceptive Coverage Under Student
Health Insurance Plans: Title IX as a Remedy for Sex Discrimination, 54 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 157, 157 (asserting that "[slex discrimination in health insurance coverage
is an industry norm").
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); see also Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 675 (1983) (contending that benefits such as
an employer-provided prescription plan are part of the employee's "compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment" protected under Title VII).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
4 See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (asserting that Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to "outlaw
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legislation questions remain over the extent to which employer
policies must accommodate the needs of women.5  These
questions are especially prevalent in employer-provided
insurance coverage. 6 Recently, in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 7
the District Court for the Western District of Washington held
that Bartell's decision not to cover prescription contraceptives in
its otherwise generally comprehensive prescription plan was
sexual discrimination because it provided less complete coverage
to female employees.8
In Erickson, an employee brought a class action 9 against
Bartell Drug Company, alleging that Bartell's decision not to
cover prescription contraceptives under its Prescription Benefit
Plan for non-union employees violated Title VII, as amended by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 10 The defendant, Bartell,
argued:
(1) treating contraceptives differently from other prescription
drugs is reasonable in that contraceptives are voluntary,
preventative, do not treat or prevent an illness or disease, and
are not truly a "healthcare" issue; (2) control of one's fertility is
any and all discrimination against any and all women in the terms and conditions of
their employment, including the benefits an employer provides to its employees").
5 See Intl Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190-92 (1991) (holding employer's
fetal protection policy forbidden as sex discrimination under Title VII); see also City
of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-18 (1978) (holding
the Department's policy of requiring female employees to make larger pension
contributions than male employees because of women's longer life expectancy
violated Title VII).
6 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 (holding the selective exclusion of
prescription contraceptives from employer's generally comprehensive prescription
plan constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1220 (D. Minn. 2001) (denying motion to dismiss because
defendant employer's failure to provide coverage for an oral contraceptive used for
treating a female hormonal disorder violated Title VII because the defendant
provided prescription coverage for the treatment of male hormonal disorders); see
also Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 181-
84 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001) (determining whether a "religious employer"
associated with the Catholic Church could exclude prescription contraceptives from
its health insurance policy).
7 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
8 Id. at 1276-77.
9 The class action was brought on behalf of all "female employees of Bartell who
at any time after December 29, 1997, were enrolled in Bartell's Prescription Benefit
Plan for non-union employees while using prescription contraceptives." Id. at 1268
n.2.
10 See id. at 1268.
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not "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" as
those terms are used in the PDA; (3) employers must be
permitted to control the costs of employment benefits by
limiting the scope of coverage; (4) the exclusion of all "family
planning" drugs and devices is facially neutral; (5) in the thirty-
seven years Title VII has been on the books, no court has found
that excluding contraceptives constitutes sex discrimination;
and (6) this issue should be determined by the legislature,
rather than the courts.11
The court disposed of each of these arguments 12 and granted
summary judgment for Erickson on her claim of disparate
treatment.' 3 Judge Lasnik ordered Bartell to "cover each of the
available options for prescription contraception to the same
extent, and on the same terms, that it covered other drugs,
devices, and preventative care for non-union employees." 14 The
court also ordered Bartell to offer coverage for contraception-
related services, including the initial physician visit, to the same
extent it did for other services. 15
Writing for the district court, Judge Lasnik reasoned that
because prescription contraceptives were used only by women,
the defendant's decision to exclude that particular benefit from
its generally comprehensive prescription plan was
discriminatory, in that the prescription plan provided less
complete coverage to its female employees than to its male
employees. 16 He established that sex discrimination does not
have to be intentional for it to be in violation of Title VII. 17 In
fact, he attributed this particular episode of discrimination to an
"unquestioned holdover from a time when employment-related
benefits were doled out less equitably than they are today."' 8
Despite its presumably innocent origins, Bartell's policy created
11 Id. at 1272.
12 See id. at 1272-77.
13 Id. at 1277.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1276-77.
17 Id. at 1272 n.7 (stating that the exclusion of women-only benefits from a
generally comprehensive prescription plan is sufficient to constitute a violation of
Title VII and that "lack of evidence of bad faith or malice toward women does not
affect the validity of plaintiffs' Title VII claim").
18 Id. at 1272 n.7; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134 (1976)
(holding that a policy excluding pregnancy from disability coverage was not
discriminatory, despite the obvious fact that "it is true that only women can become
pregnant").
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unequal treatment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.19 Judge Lasnik explained that when an employer offers
a generally comprehensive prescription plan "covering
everything except a few specifically excluded drugs and devices,
it has a legal obligation to make sure that the resulting plan
does not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics and
that it provides equally comprehensive coverage for both
sexes."
20
In determining that Bartell's discriminatory prescription
plan violated Title VII, the court recognized that prescription
contraceptives are not specifically or inadvertently mentioned in
Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 21 Judge Lasnik
asserted, however, that the goal of Title VII "was to end years of
discrimination in employment and to place all men and women,
regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin, on equal
footing in how they were treated in the workforce." 22 Lasnik also
pointed out that in enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
Congress showed that "mere facial parity of coverage does not
excuse or justify an exclusion which carves out benefits that are
uniquely designed for women."23
Judge Lasnik's attempt to ameliorate the discriminatory
conditions that exist in the workplace is commendable.
Although he also spoke vividly about the social importance of an
employer's coverage of prescription contraceptives, 24 it is
submitted that he failed to deal with the negative implications of
19 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
20 Id. at 1272; see also Intl Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (noting
that classifications based on one's "potential for pregnancy ... evinces
discrimination on the basis of sex" under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act);
Newport News Shipbuilding Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983)
(reasoning that an employer's failure to provide coverage for male employees'
dependents while providing coverage for female employees' dependents would
constitute a Title VII violation because it did not provide equally comprehensive
coverage for both sexes).
21 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
22 Id. at 1269.
23 Id. at 1271; see also Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 136 (stating that a policy "which
on its face is not sex related might nonetheless violate the Equal Protection Clause
if it were in fact a subterfuge to accomplish a forbidden discrimination").
24 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (noting that unintended pregnancies,
which can be prevented by prescription contraceptives, are too common in the
United States and create enormous financial costs and dangerous medical situations
for the mother, child, and society); see also Law supra note 1, at 346 (discussing the
statistical relationship of unintended pregnancies and failure to use birth control).
[Vol.76:423
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such a decision. It seems Judge Lasnik used broad language in
establishing that an employer's failure to cover prescription
contraceptives in its generally comprehensive prescription plan
was discrimination on the basis of sex. This Comment contends
that such a holding could lead to a large increase in litigation
over other treatments that are not uniformly covered in an
employer's health plans today. While this decision may be
deemed necessary in light of the present obstacles faced by
women in the workplace, 25 courts must also be cognizant of the
growing costs of healthcare, and the fact that employer-provided
health insurance is an employee benefit and not a government
mandate. 26
I. THE HISTORY OF EMPLOYERS' RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER
TITLE VII
Since the inception of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and prior to the enactment of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in 1978, many courts have examined the
scope of an employer's responsibilities under Title VII with
respect to its employment policies. 27 Similar issues have arisen
outside of the employment context under the Equal Protection
Clause.28 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed in 1978
25 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenoff, Women and the
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154
(1994) (discussing the particularities of discrimination based on pregnancy that
women face in the workforce).
26 See, e.g., Thomas D. Flanigan, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and
Insurance Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777,
806 (2000) (citing EEOC Interim Guidance on how "employee health plans are
fringe benefits").
27 See, e.g., Condit v. United Airlines, Inc., 631 F.2d 1136, 1138 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding an airline's policy of denying sick leave to pregnant flight attendants was
not sex discrimination under Title VII); Barwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361
(1980) (holding airline's policy of taking away flight attendants' seniority due to
pregnancy violated Title VII, when no similar requirements existed for other heath
conditions); Dessenberg v. Am. Metal Forming Co., 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11650
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 1973) (concluding that an employer's leave policy was
discriminatory in not providing sick leave during pregnancy and recuperation, when
it provided this type of leave for other non-industrial injuries and illnesses such as
alcoholism and tobacco abuse).
28 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (holding that a Utah statute
that specified a greater age of majority for males than females with respect to a
parent's obligations to pay support for the child was in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause); see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)
(concluding that the exclusion of coverage for disability accompanying a normal
20021
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in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert.29 In General Electric, the Court held that an
otherwise comprehensive short-term disability policy that
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage did not
discriminate on the basis of sex since the exclusion of pregnancy
was not in itself a gender-based discrimination, but merely a
removal of the physical condition from coverage. 30 Congress
believed that the Supreme Court's decision was an erroneous
interpretation of Title VII.31  Although the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act has provided some clarification as to an
employer's responsibilities towards its employees under Title
VII, questions do remain.32
II. NO COVERAGE FOR PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVES: THE
CONSEQUENCES
In Erickson, the Bartell Drug Company defended its decision
on many grounds. 33 Bartell argued that because prescription
contraceptive devices are voluntary and do not prevent or treat
pregnancy and childbirth does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). The Court reasoned that "there is no risk from which men
are protected and women are not" and that there is nothing in the Constitution
"that requires the State to subordinate or compromise its legitimate interests solely
to create a more comprehensive social insurance program than it already has." Id.;
see also Bond v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 381 F. Supp. 1023, 1024
(W.D. Va. 1974) (determining that the Student Health Plan's denial of coverage for
pap tests and gynecological examinations was not invidious discrimination based on
the sex of the plaintiffs because, under Geduldig, under-inclusiveness without
invidious discrimination is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
29 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
30 See id. at 138-39 (noting that "gender-based discrimination does not result
simply because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclusive").
31 See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash.
2001); see also H.R. REP No. 95-948, at 2 (1978) (finding the majority of General
Electric erred and expressing the view that the dissenting justices correctly
interpreted the Act).
32 See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 681 (8th Cir.
1996) (affirming the district court's decision that defendant employer's exclusion of
treatment for both male and female infertility problems did not constitute sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or the
American Disabilities Act); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that plaintiffs had stated a claim under the PDA and
abridging defendants' motion to dismiss on the issue of whether defendant
employer's refusal to allow female employees to use sick time to obtain treatment
for infertility constituted a violation of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act).
33 See supra text accompanying note 11.
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an illness, they are not a genuine healthcare issue. 34 The court
vigorously attacked this justification by discussing the
consequences associated with the lack of coverage of prescription
contraceptives. 35  Although prescription contraceptives are
designed to prevent pregnancy, and pregnancy is not an illness,
but rather a natural state, the court reasoned that the use and
availability of contraceptives is a serious healthcare issue.36 One
commentator has noted that "[a]lmost sixty percent of the 6.3
million pregnancies that occur annually in the United States are
unintended"37 and has asserted that unintended pregnancy: "(1)
increases infant mortality and morbidity; (2) generates financial
costs for childbirth and the care of distressed newborns; (3) leads
to high rates of abortion; and (4) limits women's abilities to
perform and contribute to society and undermines national
economic stability."38 This commentator also explained why the
exclusion of prescription contraceptives disproportionately
impacts women: "Women spend approximately sixty-eight
percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men," and
the price of prescription contraceptives is a significant reason for
this huge disparity.39
III. OPENING THE FLOODGATES
While the social problems associated with the lack of
coverage of prescription contraceptives are clear, the
implications of this decision are far less apparent. In addition to
prescription contraceptives, the Bartell Drug Company's
prescription plan specifically excluded from coverage "drugs
34 Id.
35 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. at 1273 (asserting that "[ulnintended pregnancies,
the condition which prescription contraceptives are designed to prevent, are
shockingly common in the United States and carry enormous health costs and
health consequences for the mother, the child, and society as a whole"); see also Law
supra note 1, at 364 (setting forth risks associated with unintended pregnancy).
36 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (establishing that "one reason why women
do not use birth control is that health insurance commonly excludes coverage for
effective forms of contraception that physicians provide"). See generally Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (asserting that "[t]he ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives"); Bergin, supra note 1,
at 157 (noting that most private health plans typically exclude coverage for
contraceptives).
37 Law, supra note 1, at 364.
38 Id. at 364-65.
39 Id. at 374-75.
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prescribed for weight reduction, infertility drugs, smoking
cessation drugs, dermatologicals for cosmetic purposes, growth
hormones, and experimental drugs."40 This decision may lead to
increased demands for coverage for infertility treatments and
experimental treatments for women that affect only women. 41
Erickson, though, is not likely to lead to further demands for the
coverage of abortions because abortions are specifically excluded
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 42  Professor Law
contends that the abortion exclusion in the act "confirms that
Congress understood that discrimination against pregnancy and
related medical conditions encompassed discrimination against
measures taken to avoid pregnancy."43
As a result of the decision in Erickson, employees
presumably will continue to fight for coverage of infertility
treatments. In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, a
female employee brought suit against her employer for its
refusal to cover treatment for male and female infertility
problems. 44  The court granted summary judgment for the
defendant based on, inter alia, the fact that the "[pilan did not
violate the PDA because treatment for infertility is not
treatment for pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical
condition."45 A similar decision was reached in Saks v. Franklin
Covey Co., 46 where the court also concluded that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act did not require an employer to provide
insurance coverage for infertility treatments. 4" If one follows
Professor Law's rationale, however, perhaps infertility should be
covered because it, too, is not specifically excluded from coverage
in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
40 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 n. 1.
41 Based on the court's analysis, if prescription contraceptives existed for both
men and women, an employer would be warranted in excluding its coverage because
this method of curbing costs is would then not be discriminatory. See id. at 1276.
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (providing that the PDA "shall not require an
employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where
medical complications have arisen from an abortion").
43 Law, supra note 1, at 380 (asserting that "if Congress had intended to leave
employers free to disfavor contraceptive services in employee benefit plans,
Congress could have easily added the words 'or contraception' to the abortion
exclusion").
44 See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
45 Id. at 676.
46 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
47 Id. at 329.
[Vol.76:423
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Another potential consequence of Erickson is that it will
provoke controversy among religious groups and employers that
do not believe in the use of prescription contraceptives, much
less the coverage of prescription contraceptives. 48 In the recent
case of Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court
of Sacramento County,49 for example, Catholic Charities sought a
preliminary injunction to permit it to provide its employees with
health insurance that did not cover prescription contraceptives.50
The Court of Appeals of California refused to grant the
injunction and denied a writ of mandate on the grounds that the
California prescription coverage statutes have a secular purpose
and do not violate the religious guarantees of the United States
and California Constitutions.5 1 Although Title VII does provide
an exemption for religious organizations, 52  courts have
interpreted the exemption narrowly, as prohibiting "invidious
discrimination on the basis of gender."5 3 In light of Erickson, the
first federal case holding that employers with generally
comprehensive prescription plans must cover prescription
contraceptives, it seems likely that religious employers will
protest the protection afforded to coverage of prescription
contraceptives under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act.
IV. WHO SHOULD BEAR THE COST ASSOCIATED WITH COVERAGE?
While public policy may warrant the coverage of prescription
contraceptives, 54 one must consider who should bear the cost. In
Erickson, Judge Lasnik struck down Bartell's argument that the
48 See Law, supra note 1, at 384 (discussing that "[rieligious opposition to
contraception has been a central factor in recent debates on proposed state laws
requiring insurance coverage for contraception"). See generally Catholic Charities,
Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001).
49 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001).
50 Id. at 181.
51 Id.
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000) (stating that prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of race or sex does not apply "to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on
of such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities").
53 Law, supra note 1, at 384-85 (holding Christian school could not fire teacher
based on the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried (citing Dolter v. Wahlert
High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980))).
54 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
20021
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increased costs associated with the coverage of prescription
contraceptives was sufficient to warrant the exclusion of
coverage. 55 Lasnik reasoned that "[w]hile it is undoubtedly true
that employers may cut benefits, raise deductibles, or otherwise
alter coverage options to comply with budgetary constraints, the
method by which the employer seeks to curb costs must not be
discriminatory."56 In City of Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power v. Manhart,57 the Supreme Court also refused to
allow defendants to cite "cost" as an excuse for its discriminatory
policy, requiring female employees to make larger pension
contributions than male employees because of their longer life
expectancy. 58 One commentator argued that the actual cost of
full prescription contraceptive coverage is "deminimus,"59 and
that the exclusion of prescription contraceptives from health
insurance plans is "economically indefensible."60 Given the data
suggesting that the addition of contraceptives to a health plan
does not significantly raise costs, why hasn't Congress passed
any legislation requiring employers to cover prescription
contraceptives in their generally comprehensive prescription
plans? Perhaps the reason is that Congress feels employers
should not be forced to bear this burden.
In contrast to the cases brought under Title VII, cost has
been successfully raised as a defense for exclusions of coverage in
other instances. 61 In McGann v. H & H Music Co.,62 an employee
55 See id. at 1274 (stating that cost is not a defense to allegations of violations
of Title VII); see also Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Comp.
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084-85 n.14 (1983) (stating that the PDA
establishes "that the greater cost of providing retirement benefits for women as a
class cannot justify differential treatment based on sex").
56 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
57 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
58 Id. at 716-17 (stating that there is no cost defense to Title VII violations).
59 Bergin, supra note 1, at 159.
60 Id. at 160 (asserting that "contraceptive coverage pays for itself' and that "a
15 percent increase in the number of oral contraceptive users in a health plan would
provide enough savings in pregnancy costs alone to provide oral contraceptive
coverage for all users in the plan"); see also Lisa Girion, Costs and Benefits:
Employers Weighing Birth Control Coverage Consider Other Factors Besides the Up
Front Expenses, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Wi (citing a study by the Alan
Guttmacher Institute which found that adding birth control pills to a health plan
raises costs less than one percent, about eighteen dollars per employee).
61 See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that cost was an appropriate motivation for an employer to reduce
coverage in its health insurance plan under the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 [ERISA], the principal federal statute regulating employee
[Vol.76:423
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who was infected with AIDS was entitled to lifetime medical
benefits of up to one million dollars under his employer-provided
insurance plan.63 McGann disclosed his disease to his employer,
H & H Music Company, after which the employer announced a
change that would limit benefits payable to AIDS related claims
to a lifetime maximum of $5,000.64 McGann challenged the
change in the policy as discriminatory since he was the only
employee known to be suffering from AIDS and the change was
clearly implemented in response to McGann's disclosure of his
disease and his filing for claims under the policy.65 McGann
sued under section 510 of ERISA which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled
under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan.66
Reasoning that Congress had not intended to take away an
employer's ability to control its plan, the court upheld the change
in policy as valid on the ground that H & H Music Company's
purpose was to avoid the expense of paying for AIDS related
treatment, not to retaliate against this particular employee.67
The court also noted that in order to establish a violation
under ERISA, there must be proof of specific discriminatory
benefit plans); Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988)
(rejecting retirees' ERISA claim that an employer could not change the level of
benefits without their retirees consent, and establishing that "medical insurance
must take account of inflation, changes in medical practice and technology, and
increases in the costs of treatment independent of inflation").
62 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
63 Id. at 403.
64 See id. This was not the only change implemented in the policy. The
employer also raised individual and family deductibles, eliminated coverage for
chemical dependency treatment, and increased contribution requirements. See id. at
403 n.1.
65 See id. at 403. H & H Music Company conceded that the implementation of
the reduction of coverage in the policy for AIDS-related benefits was prompted by
the disclosure of McGann's disease. See id. at 403-04.
66 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000). McGann argued that H & H Music Company had
discriminated against him in violation of both prohibitions of section 510 of ERISA.
See McGann, 946 F.2d at 403.
67 See McGann, 946 F.2d at 408 (stating that if a "federal court could prevent
an employer from reducing an employee's coverage limits for AIDS treatment once
that employee contracted AIDS, the boundaries of judicial involvement in the
creation, alteration or termination of ERISA plans would be sorely tested").
20021
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intent to engage in activity prohibited under section 510.68
Conversely, in making his determination in Erickson, Judge
Lasnik relied on the fact that discrimination need not be
intentional to constitute a violation of Title VII.6 9 While the
discrimination seemed more overt in McGann, it appears to be
more difficult to establish a violation under ERISA than it is
under Title VII. The policy reasons behind the high standard
invoked under ERISA seem quite relevant to claims brought
under Title VII as well. 70 In McGann, the court reasoned that
summary judgment in favor of the defendant was proper because
the "defendant's motive was to ensure the future existence of the
plan and not specifically to retaliate against McGann or to
interfere with his exercise of future rights under the plan."71
Courts should also be mindful of the effects of their decisions
under Title VII with respect to the future existence of employer-
provided health insurance.7 2
CONCLUSION
Although Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
have afforded women greater opportunities in the workplace,
questions remain with respect to the scope of these acts. Courts
have played an integral role in the application of Title VII and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to changing conditions in
society, such as the current need for coverage of prescription
68 See id. at 404.
69 See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271-72 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (noting that "[elven if one were to assume that Bartell's prescription plan was
not the result of intentional discrimination, the exclusion of women-only benefits
from a generally comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title
VII"); see also Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 (1983) (asserting that where a benefit
plan is facially discriminatory, it is not necessary to establish subjective intent).
70 See Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating
that limiting an employer's right to change health insurance plans would, in effect,
"decrease protection for future employees and retirees"); see also Moore v. Reynolds
Metals Co. Ret. Program for Salaried Employees, 740 F.2d 454, 457 (6th Cir. 1984)
(asserting that "judicial interference into the establishment of pension plan
provisions... would serve only to discourage employers from creating voluntary
pension plans").
71 McGann, 946 F.2d at 404.
72 See Moore, 740 F.2d at 456 (writing that "courts have no authority to decide
which benefits employers must confer upon their employees; these are decisions
which are more appropriately influenced by forces in the marketplace and, when
appropriate, by federal legislation").
[Vol.76:423
20021 ERICKSON V. BARTELL DRUG CO. 435
contraceptives. This Comment has suggested that the
consequences associated with the unavailability of prescription
contraceptives are dangerous; however, it has also suggested
that in focusing on social issues in making decisions, courts, such
as in Erickson, have neglected to consider the implications of
their decisions. Perhaps Erickson is the point at which the court
should have deferred to Congress, despite continued
Congressional failure to establish legislation requiring
employers to cover prescription contraception. Perhaps
Congress's decision not to mandate coverage of contraception is
based on its recognition that employer-provided health insurance
plans must be permitted to adapt to societal changes to ensure
the future existence of those of the plans.
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